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of the action by ITN
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1st
Bn XX The Lancashire Fusiliers
Egypt Ismalia |
The Times Newspaper 23rd October 2003 A note from David Prince |
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This is the official report
to the House of Commons at the time :-
EGYPT (BRITISH MILITARY ACTION, ISMAILIA) HC Deb 31 January 1952 vol 495 cc362-5 362 § Mr. Aneurin Bevan (by Private Notice) asked the Secretary of State for War whether, arising out of the statement by the Foreign Secretary on Tuesday, he is now in a position to give the House more details concerning the recent clash between British Forces and Egyptian auxiliary police in Ismailia. § The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head)
§ Following is the statement: § General. § On 16th October, 1951, the Egyptian police failed to control the riots which broke out in Ismailia and British troops had to restore order. After this 600 auxiliary police arrived from Cairo. § Egyptian terrorists had been and continued attacking our troops and convoys while the Egyptian police looked on. In some cases the auxiliary police, alongside the terrorists, attacked our troops. On 17th, 18th and 19th November, 1951, the auxiliary police fired on our patrols in Ismailia. After this General Erskine arranged for the regular and auxiliary Egyptian police to remain in their barracks while our families evacuated the town. After this both regular and auxiliary police in Ismailia were replaced by fresh companies from Cairo. § The normal rôle in Egypt of auxiliary police is to provide a reserve for riot duty armed with staves. Those sent to the Canal Zone on both occasions were armed with rifles. 363 § Twenty auxiliary police and four terrorists in a lorry attacked a road block near Tel-El-Kebir. As a result of this and other attacks in the neighbourhood our troops cleared the area, finding, in the police station compound of El Hammada (a small village), a senior police major-general and 116 armed police, as well as quantities of ammunition and other arms. § The steadily mounting casualties amongst our troops and the attacks upon them caused the Commander-in-Chief, at the end of November, 1951, to recommend the disarming of the auxiliary police. On 7th December, 1951, His Majesty's Government authorised the Commander-in-Chief to take this step if the situation demanded it. § On 23rd January, 1952, when our casualties had reached 33 killed and 69 wounded, the Commander-in-Chief told the Chiefs of Staff that, in view of the repeated evidence of attack by the auxiliary police, he considered that he must disarm those in Ismailia, and that he had ordered General Erskine to do so. His Majesty's Government approved this decision. § Narrative of Events § Location of Egyptian Police on morning of 25th January. § The position in Ismailia on the morning of 25th January was: (a) About 400 Egyptian police, of whom about 60 were
regulars, were in the Caracol, the normal regular Police Station and the
Governor's Office. § Message to the Sub-Governor of Ismailia § The operation started with a message to the Sub-Governor of Ismailia to the effect that, since the auxiliary police had been firing on our troops as well as helping the terrorists, it was necessary to disarm them. He was therefore requested to order them to come out of their barracks without arms, and told that arms would be restored to the regular police who would then be allowed to continue their duties. § Message to the Major-General Commanding the Police § A similar message was sent to the major-general commanding the police who was at his residence. He replied that both the regular and auxiliary police would resist in accordance with their orders from the Egyptian Government. In view of this statement the operations against the Caracol and the Bureau Sanitaire were put in train. 364 § In operations against the Caracol Egyptian casualties did not exceed single figures and ours were none. The Egyptian police opened fire first and subsequently fired repeatedly. The buildings were not damaged. § The Bureau Sanitaire § The major operations took place against the Bureau Sanitaire of which the occupants were almost all auxiliary police. This building had been substantially fortified since its occupation by the auxiliary police. § At 0614 hours and continuing until 0640 hours broadcasts were made from loudspeaker vans calling upon the police to surrender. At 0656 hours firing by the police started from the Bureau Sanitaire and continued with increasing intensity until 0710 hours. We then retaliated by firing one round of blank from a 20-pounder tank gun as a warning. The police continued to fire. § At 0715 hours we returned the fire for the first time, six rounds of 20-pounder tank gun and a few rounds of two-pounder being fired as well as small arms. This produced a very heavy fusillade from the police. § A fresh broadcast was then made, followed by a pause to give them time to surrender. At 0815 hours fire was again opened by us on the same scale, followed by a broadcast with another pause for surrender. All this had no effect on the police and they continued to fire. § At 0900 hours two platoons of our infantry, supported by tanks, forced their way inside the walled compound of the Bureau Sanitaire which was used as barracks by the auxiliary police. Our infantry quickly suffered fourteen casualties and were withdrawn. § Final Surrender § At 1000 hours fire was opened again and at 1037 hours surrender started. We suffered three killed and 13 wounded. The Egyptian police casualties were 41 killed, 73 wounded, and 886 surrendered. § Weapons used by British Troops § The weapons used by our troops consisted of small arms, tanks from which 23 rounds of 20-pounder were fired, armoured cars which used a few rounds of two-pounder ammunition. No artillery, aircraft or mortars were used except for one round of 2 in. smoke. § Comments § The operation was planned with the object of avoiding bloodshed. The buildings were surrounded at dawn and every possible effort was then made to persuade the police to surrender, but the responsible officials refused to take any action and the police general in Ismailia steadfastly remained in his quarters throughout the whole proceedings. § The police in the Bureau Sanitaire were first called upon to surrender at 0614 hours, but it was not until 0715 hours that British troops opened fire in spite of the fact that they themselves had been under fire from the Egyptians since 0656 hoursnearly 20 minutes earlier. 365 § There were no casualties to civilians. Transport was produced quickly after the surrender and prisoners were taken away for a meal, whilst our doctors gave immediate medical attention to the wounded, some of whom were taken to our hospital and the remainder to the Egyptian hospital. § If the Egyptian Government had maintained proper control over their police forces and, in particular, their auxiliaries, it would never have been necessary to carry out the operation at all. |
RAF Vampire
Collision
EGYPT 1952 At crack of dawn on Thursday 1st May 1952 the Battalion Second in Command, Major John Corbyn DSO, MC and I had to take out a search party of Fusiliers and a RAF doctor in two Jeeps and two Bren Gun Carriers into the Sinai desert. Two RAF Vampire fighters had collided in mid air and dropped into the sand sea towards the Palestine border. Apparently they smashed during the morning of the previous day and RAF Desert Rescue Squads went out immediately but in twenty four hours they had only managed to cover two miles so the task was passed to 1LF. When we arrived at the Ferry across the Suez Canal we were told that a RAF Police vehicle has managed to get within two miles of the crash site but had run out of petrol. It took us five hours to get to the scene of the collision, a distance of about thirty five miles, the last twelve through sand dunes about three hundred feet high. Certainly the worst bit of desert I encountered in Egypt. We picked up one of the pilots almost immediately; he had bailed out and was found by Bedouins who looked after him for twenty four hours. We did not find the other pilot for seven hours and when we reached him he was dead. He had managed to get out of his plane but did not open his parachute. The Doctor who was with us said he was not fit to be moved so we buried him on the spot. The following morning after having supplies dropped to us we brought the first pilot in to RAF Ismailia and then went home and piled into bed. Friday evening we travelled down to Fayid to watch the Battalion boxing team fight the 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment in the finals of the Army Egypt Competition. We beat them by ten fights to three .they were not as tough as they were made out to be. An interesting couple of days with 1LF. Maurice Taylor |
A few Memories of the day the
XXth
Disarmed the Egyptian Police in Ismalia
Photograph of a couple of trophies taken from the Armoury of the Caracol Maurice |
THE DISARMING OF THE POLICE IN ISMAILIA.
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1LF Road, Rail and Canal Blocks
on the Routes from Cairo to Ismailia
October 1951 Along the Suez Canal from Port Said to Suez
the internal security situation started to deteriorate quite rapidy
in the first two weeks of October 1951. We read that the Moslem Brotherhood
had formed Liberation Battalions and attacks on soldiers with the theft
of arms and ammunition from British bases and personnel increased. |
Cairo-Ishmaili Road Block Well what do y'know. There's another blast from the past. A photo of Sgt Holmes, on Maurice's, Cairo-Ishmailia 'Road block' report. He and Sgt Connoly were our Mortar Pln Sgts. As you look at the photo, the infamous Sweet Water Canal is nearby on the left. Our bivouac area with its two-man tents is to the right in a peanut field. We were inclined to think the whole operation was a waste of time, because we could only search the male passengers and not the females, (not that we wanted to search them of course?). If any male was carrying weapons or anything of the sort, the female would hide them under her long black dress, while only the male got of the bus to be searched. One time, while we were on the Road Block, Fus Bob Stevens, fell into the canal and had a bit of trouble trying to climb up the slippery bank to get out as nobody would give him a hand. We just stood there and laughed at him. Because, (so it was put about)if you came in contact with water from the Sweet Water Canal which was used as drinking water, a lavatory, washing the dishes, dumping dead dogs, cats and donkeys. Even dead bodies had been found in it. Then you would have to have about 50 injections and wait to see what happens. I will today, e-mail Joe, a poem written by the Mortar's Fus Cronnoly recalling the time Bob Steven's fell into the Canal. (see A1 & A2 below Middle East Medal) However; back to the photo. I'm having trouble
trying to recognise our lad on the left of the photo who has a Black
Eye and Over Developed Nipples!! Cheers, Jim.
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These Photos have been
locked away in a camera for 40 years what gems they. ALAN WHITTALL
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The next two photos have been
sent to us by Malcolm Bingham |
ISMAILIA CASUALTIES 19038787 L/Cpl. Eastham, H. "C
Coy" 22208211 L/Cpl. McKenzie,J. "C
Coy" The Following
receivedWounds Lest We Forget. The" Lads from Lancashire" performed in the best traditions of the British Army, yet recognition was not to be theirs. Because of Political expedience,this gallant action went almost unnoticed and was played down by the Government. Within a very short time 1LF
were off to Kenya |
Also Killed in terrorist action
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"
The Enemy Dead at Ismailia"
As soldiers we treat our enemy with dignity and respect. These men were killed in action against the 1st Bn The XXth The Lancashire Fusiliers and deserve to be mentioned as part of our history. I understand that they were all given a proper burial in line with their own customs and beliefs. Please do not click on the link below if you could be offended. Click on here to go to the Photos |