CSM Scarratt,
The Tennis Court,
Kohima.

Japanese War diary entries and memories of the LF
Chindits in Burma.

I trust you find this of interest
Regards
Jennifer Willbourn

Document No. 1

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1.Captured Documents -- Staff Officers Account of Battle for Kohima

(a) Among the masses of documents in the Basha area at MILE 87, the HQ of 31 Div Inf Gp, during the advance down the IMPHAL road, there was known to be much material of great interest and importance. Translations of these documents are gradually coming through and the latest one received is the translation of a "very secret" notebook belonging to Major Yamaguchi, an officer on the staff of 31 Div inf Gp, containing details of the operations around KOHIMA between 4th April and 15th May, ie. From the break through to Kohima up to the withdrawal to ARADURA

(b) The document begins with a review of the situation prior to the KOHIMA operations proper. It shows that the main task of 58 Regt Group the "Left thrust force" of 31 Division under command of Major general MIYAZAKI, commander of 31 Div Inf Gp was to capture MAO SONGSANG. Following the defeat of our forces in the SANGSHAK area the regt has carried out a very rapid advance from UKHRUL to eh TUPHEMA area, where it arrived on 1st april. Considerable opposition had been expected at MAO, but when a local report was received on the evening of 1st April that our forces had evacuated MOA, it was immediately decided to exploit to VISWEMA. On 2nd April the Regt received orders from Division to make an independent attack on KOHIMA.

(c) The writer then proceeds to a discussion of factors affecting operations. He mentions that in the early stages the attitude of the local inhabitants was favourable, because it was strictly laid down that no troops except administrative personnel specially detailed were to enter villages. Purchase of food was easy. In the course of the KOHIMA operation, however, purchase of food became more and more difficult as the villages were abandoned owing to our artillery fire.

(d) In a review of own and enemy strength organisation, tactics etc. the writer gives the organisation of 58 Regt for the operations.

(i) Right Attack Force

3 Bn 58 Regt
6 Tp Mtn Arty
Pl 2 Engr Coy
Type 5 Wireless Sec
Medical Det

(ii)Left Attack Force
HQ 58 Regt
2 Bn 58 Regt
TWO pls Regtl Arty
Type 3 and Type 5 Wireless Secs
2 Bty Mtn Arty (less 6 tp)

(iii) Raiding Party
2 and 4 Coys 1 Bn 58 Regt
TWO pls Regtl Arty
Pl 2 Eng Coy
Type 3 and type 5 wireless Secs
Medical Det

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(e) Giving enemy order of battle on 13 May the writer lists correctly the formations then in the line (GOC 2 Div is given as Major General GROWLER) but does not proceed to any detailed examination or estimated of strength. He stresses the enormous fire power opposing the Japs and the plentiful supply of ammunition which enabled us to fire such powerful concentrations. Discussing our fight qualities he makes a number of derogatory remarks "unless they receive overwhelming fire power in support, they will not make a frontal attack" - but concedes that "in circumstances where enemy has supporting fire power, they will show unexpected bravery and offer stiff resistance. For instance he will alight from a standard tank at extremely short range from us, to make repairs, or to get another tank to him. Then again, even when he is surrounded by our forces, he will, supported by air craft and arty fire, resist to the bitter end".
(f) Examining our battle tactics he again stresses our reliance on firepower to which he attributes the fact that we seldom make night attacks. He considers this a definite weakness in our tactics and says " even when we (the enemy) had decided that escape from an encirclement was practically impossible we were able to slip away by night. We have wide scope for night infiltration and patrolling. He thought. However, there were indications that "gradually the enemy will commence night operations in the futures".
(g) There follows a more or less day-by-day account of the battle from the Japanese point of view. This is at times obscure and hard to relate to our own picture. There are certain discrepancies; the features referred to are sometimes difficult to identify with certainty while the varying designations applied to units together with the changes in their composition are sometime bewildering. For this reason only the main points, which emerge from the account, are given here. (The accounts deal practically entirely with the operations immediately concerning 58 Regt i.e. On the KOHIMA Ridge and little mention is made of the NAGA Village operations I in which 138 Regt played the major part)

(i) The enemy was quick to exploit the situation produced by our own evacuation of MAO. His plan was as follows: Right attack force to advance MAO - KIGIMA- KHEZOMA-CHAKHABAMA to engage own troops in the CHEDEMA area, then pursue them northwards to the NERHEMA area. Left Attack Force "after eliminating from area SOUTH of KOHIMA, to the advance towards PRIPHEMA". The raiding party was to advance WEST from MARAM and "cut the enemy line of retreat from KOHIMA" (NOTE: this was the force which we located in the PULOMI area and which, it was anticipated, might be directed onto railway line SOUTH of the MANIPUR road.

(ii) The plan went unexpectedly well to start with. No resistance was encountered by Left Attack Force until MILE 50 and by 5th April the enemy was in occupation of ARADURA Hill and exploiting towards KOHIMA. Right Attack Force on the same day reported no enemy on the CHEDEM Ridge and by dusk Pt 5120 in the NAGA Village had been occupied. General MIYAZAKI, thinking that KOHIMA was completely captured, ordered the Right Attack force to break into the town and "pursue enemy to pre-arranged line". Commander 2 Bn 58 Regt was ordered to block the road WEST of KOHIMA with as many men as possible also to attack "in order to force as many men as possible to remain in the font line".

(iii) The Left Attack Force, however, had struck the main strength of our opposition on the KOHIMA Ridge, JAIL HILL was occupied on 6th April after a costly attack which cost half a company including Company Commander and all PLATOON commanders, but out Garrison was still firmly entrenched. Reviewing Japanese mistakes in the operations, the writer's notes that the first major mistake occurred at this point. He says " the enemy was underestimated" It was estimated that if the enemy in KOHIMA area abandoned the line CHEDEMA -PFUCHAMA -

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ARADURA Hill, he would have to carry out withdrawal. Accordingly it was judged that when right Attack Force broke into the city, complete occupation would immediately follow, and that when LONG HOUSE HILL (JAIL HILL) was captured this would shortly be followed by the capture of the high ground to the NORTH. Because of this, pursuit northwards was ordered too soon…" In other words the enemy failed to achieve concentration of force against our garrison and lost the advantage of surprise, which his rapid advance from MAO had won him.

(iv) Both Left and Right Attack Forces now engaged in a series of attacks to capture the positions on the KOHIMA Ridge, and though they steadily reduced the perimeter held by our Garrison, they suffered very heavy casualties from the "Hornet's nest" of which the Garrison defences had now become. On 7th April the enemy suffered a considerable disaster when a large ammunition dump in the vicinity of which Regtl H. and HQ 2 Bn were located, was exploded by our artillery fire Because of the failure to capture the Ridge the raiding force at PULOMA received orders to proceed KHONOMA - JOTSOMA - KOHIMA (we successfully shelled and straffed this force in the KHONOMA area on April 17th when it moved into the JOTSOMA area and occupied positions to the SOUTH)

-6-

(v) An enemy attempt to blow the bridge across the DZUNA NALA at mile 39½ on 19th April was unsuccessful at the charge failed to explode.
(vi) From 17th April enemy attacks on the garrison continued and the 17th April the enemy succeeded in capturing F.S.D. and KUKI PICQUET, but "mopping up was still not complete". Our attack on TERRACED HILL according to the writer " almost wiped out" 4 coy and survivors numbered only about 15. both Right and Left Attack Forces attacking on the night 19th April suffered many casualties without making appreciable
(vii) Progress". General MIYAZAKI then decided to make an all out assault on 22 nd April.
(viii) The same day orders were received that 31 Div was to despatch the bulk of 124 Regt to
(ix) IMPHAL but 1 Bn 138 Regt was to be available to assist in the general assault.
(x) On 12 April the order to despatch this force to IMPHAL was cancelled.

(xi)

(xii)
(xiii) and survivors numbered about 15. Both Right and Left Attack Forces attacking on

Document No. 2

SECRET
OPERATIONS OF 4 INF BDE-APRIL-JUNE 1944

4 Inf Bde arrived at DIMAPUR and JERHAT Aerodromes between the 10th and 15th April. By the 16th June the Bde had concentrated in the area of the 32nd Mile Stone and Priphema. Its tasks were to hold the area 32 Mile Stone Khabvuma (a village about one and a half miles north of 32 Mile Stone) Priphema to keep the road open between Zubza and Priphema and Khabvuma. At this time 5 Inf Bde was operating about MS38 to 40 to open the rd to Jhotsaoma and Kohima. About 1 regiment of Japanese was concentrated on the Merema Ridge with the probable object of cutting the rd at Priphema and advance elements of this force had been encountered in the Dzuma Valley and near Khabvuma.

In this area 2 Norfolk and 18LF carried out extensive patrolling but little contact was made with the enemy. On the18th April patrols of the 1 R.S. discovered a force of about 60 - 100 Japanese dug in about 500 yards east of Khabvuma on a spur leading down to the Dzuma Valley. The position was extremely strong and an attack by One Coy of 1 R.S. supported by 16 F.D Regt. RA failed to dislodge the enemy. A further attack was made by 1 R.S. on the 20th and this also failed. The artillery and air bombardments proved so costly to the enemy that he withdrew on the night of the 23rd/24th April leaving behind about 30-40 dead and considerable arms, equipment and documents.

On the 24th April after 6 Inf. Bde. had relieved the Kohima Garrison. Operation "STRIDENT" was planned. 4 Inf. Bde. consisting of 1 R.S, 2 Norfolk, 143 SS Coy. Sec. of 5 Fd. Coy. and a P1 of "A" Coy. 2 Manch. with HQ 99Fd. Regt. was to advance round the enemy's flank via Kohima to the ridge SOUTH of PULEBADZE and establish a strong position behind the enemy on the ARADURA SPUR. 18 L.F. was not available for the operation having been placed under comd. of 5 Inf Bde. for the operation to cross the DZUMA Valley to the MEREMA Ridge, 200 to 300 Naga Coolies were made available for 4 Inf Bde. to lift rations, ammunition and food. The route of the encirclement was over country far too difficult for mule transport.

The march began at the 40 Mile Stone at dusk on 25th April.
The march to Konoma had been estimated to take approximately 3 hours but considerable confusion was caused owing to inexperience in the handling of porters and the difficulty of guiding the column along the steep single file path in darkness. It was not until 0700 on the 26th that the whole of the First Column consisting of 2 Norfolk and Bde HQ had reached Konoma. On 30th April the Bde had concentrated in a deep ravine behind the PULEBADZE RIDGE about 3 miles south west of ARADURA. The speed of advance over the mountains was very much slower than had been expected with the result that the rations carried on the men had been consumed by this time and it was necessary to delay for 3 days in this " DEATH VALLEY", a miserable glen perpetually shaded in mist with huge trees forever dripping water. While the Bde. waited here for3 days, relays of Nagas ferried up rations from Konoma.

At this stage the Bde was ordered by 2 Div. that its' objective was GPT RIDGE, known to be held by the enemy, instead of ARADURA which was thought not to be occupied by the Japanese.
On the 1st and 2nd May the Bde. moved north along the PULEBADZE knife edged ridge and on the 3rd was concentrated on a heavily wooded spur of PULEBADZE about 1000 yards above GPT Ridge. So far there was no sign that the Japs suspected the presence of 4 Inf Bde. on their flank, but during the afternoon a Jap patrol on the ridge encountered the porter train and killed 3 Nagas afterwards attempting to attack a Coy. Of 1 R.S. which was the rear Coy of the Bde. 1 R.S. killed 3 Jap officers and 16 other ranks and the remainder withdrew. The death of the porters caused the remainder to cease work and they withdrew for their customary 5 days mourning. As a result of this a great deal of valuable stores had to be dumped and buried in "Death Valley" and on the PULEBADZE Ridge while the vitally important ammunition and rations were ferried forward by the rear Coys. Of 1 R.S.

2

The attack on GPT Ridge was carried out on 4th May. Briefly the plan was for 2 Norfolk to capture the highest point of GPT Ridge below the edge of the jungle with 143 SS Coy. protecting their RIGHT Flank.. On the capture of GPT Ridge 1 RS were to pas through 2 Norfolk and capture the Pimple at the end of the GPT Ridge by the rd opposite JAIL HILL. The battle for GPT Ridge was essentially a 2 Norfolk victory. A Jap Coy. position was discovered astride the track leading to 2 Norfolk Start Line just short of the jungle edge. This position was bypassed in the thick jungle and 2 Norfolk fought their way round on GPT Ridge where they rushed the Jap defences off their feet and took their objective by mid afternoon. They were then faced with more determined and far better organised resistance on the more open NORTH EASTERN end of GPT Ridge. By now it was too late for 1 RS to mount an attack on the positions beyond 2 Norfolk objective and the Bde. established defended localities on 2 Norfolk objective and in the jungle 400 yards SOUTH WEST. The enemy position between the Bde and PULEBADZ, which had been by-passed, still remained, and the Japs in the ARADURA Valley and NORTH EAST at the end of the ridge were well dug in and full of fight.

The ammunition state did not cause worry as 1 RS had not yet been heavily engaged but 2 Norfolk would soon require replenishing. Rations and water, however, were short and half rations were all that was available for several days and water was restricted to one bottle per man per day. On the 5th May 33 Ind Inf Bde established a mile route to the Bde. which was cut by a Jap counter-attack on 7th May. The same day, Brigadier GOSCHEN was killed at 2 Norfolk position while reconnoitring for a fresh attack of the NORTH EASTERN end of GPT Ridge. The opening of a supply route was made a priority task for the Division and was soon opened by 33 Bde.

During the days about Brigadier GOSCHEN's death 2 Norfolk made several costly attempts to advance further along the ridge, but succeeded only in making minor improvements to their position. 1 RS carried out vigorous patrol activities in the ARADURA Valley and in 1 day's anti- sniper drive killed at least 30 Japs and established patrol superiority in the area immediately round their defended locality. On the 14th 1 RS with tank support cleared the area between the Norfolks and JAIL HILL, which had been captured by 33 Bde. a few days before. While co-ordinating 1 RS attack, Brig THEOBALDS, who had succeeded Brig GOSCHEN, was killed by a grenade at 2 Norfolk position.

The operation to secure GPT Ridge was now completed; the Bde. held the feature and patrolled forward across the ARADURA Valley.

The next operation in which the Bde. took part was an attack on ARADURA feature by 1 R.S. and 2 Norfolks. The Jap position was skilfully chosen and the assault had to be made up an extremely steep slope. 2 Norfolk on the right encountered heavy LMG fire and showers of grenades just below the crest and those few men who reached the crest came under fire from positions in depth on the reverse slopes which could not be eliminated by artillery fire and could not be approached by tanks. 1 R.S. on the left succeeded in taking their first objective but were unable to hold it on account of fire from the same reverse slope positions which 2 Norfol;k could not reach, and also were shelled on their first objective by a 75mm gun at close range. Further gallant attempts were made during the afternoon to take the position, but these also met with failure for the same reasons and the 2 Bns. were ordered to withdraw.

/3………………….

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On the 5th of June the enemy withdrew from ARADURA and on the 6th of June 4 Bde. lead the advance of 2 Div. down the IMPHAL road and by the evening of the 7th had encountered enemy at KIGWEMA village after mopping up isolated parties of Japs around KIGWEMA Hospital during the day. On the 8th June 1 R.S. advanced to MS 56.5 after clearing the Jap positions at KIGWEMA.
1/8 LF passed through 1 R.S and continued without opposition as far as 59 milestone. Here they were engaged by an anti-tank gun which they destroyed and at the 60th milestone the Lancashire Fusiliers encountered stiff opposition. All attempts by the L.Fs to force the road block between the spur and the village that day failed. In the middle of the afternoon 2 Norfolk moved up the spur to the right of the LFs. from about MS 59.75 to be positioned for an out flanking attack on 9th June. On the 9th June 1/8 LF continued to advance with tank support but were unable to clear the road block owing to enemy grenade and LMG fire from above the road.. About midday a Coy of LFs and a Coy. Of R.S. succeeded in establishing themselves in this part of the village nearest to the road despite considerable fire from a Jap 75mm gun and automatic fire from the spur above the road opposite the village..
2 Norfolk at 1600 hrs attempted to attack to clear the spur above the village. This attack pierced the Jap defences but was held up when still high on the spur.. A heavy Jap counter attack was launched but was held off.

On the 10th June 1 R.S with support from Div Artillery captured VISWEMA village and by nightfall 1 R.S and 1/8 LF were solid in VISWEMA and it was possible to supply them by armoured carrier along the road. Occasional casualties were caused by sniping from the spur along the road over-looking the village. On the 11th June a Coy. of 2 Norfolk again attempted to clear the spur above the village but were unable to do so.

The operation to clear the VISWEMA spur now became a Divisional task and 4 LF held the ground thus far gained and assisted 5 Bde. who cleared the NORTH end of VISWEMA village and the spur which was the main core of the enemy resistance.

When the VISWEMA position was cleared on the 14th June 6 Bde. continued the advance down the road and 4 Bde was with drawn to rest and refit.

The Bde. joined battle again on the 19th passing through 5 Bde.at MARAM when 1 R.S. captured the high ground EAST of MS 82 on the 20th June. Considerable numbers of enemy were left in the MARAM area to be mopped up by 5 Bde. and the advance continued unhindered as far as 88th MS where a road block was encountered. Here the enemy attempted to blow a prelaid charge under the loading armoured car and failed to do so. The Bde. remained concentrated for the night in the area of the 87th Milestone where the enemy had been surprised by the swift advance and had left large quantities of documents, personal kit and food still cooking on the fire. The enemy appeared to be holding the high ground at Pt 4808 with a gun firing on the road at MS 88. So far the enemies action tended to confirm his plan shown in marked map captured at MS 82. Later, it was discovered that his position at MS 88 was only lightly held and that his defences at MARAM had fallen too quickly for him to occupy his chosen position before we reached them

On the 22nd the Japs had withdrawn from MS 88 and the advance continued without opposition as far as MS 103.. The only Japs seen were stragglers who were swiftly disposed of The Bde then held the ground gained and the advance was continued by 6 Bde.