When the Egyptian Government abrogated their treaty with Great Britain on the 15th October 1951, the 1st Bn. The Lancashire Fusiliers was warned to be ready for internal security duties in Ismailia on the following day. "A" Company was placed on one-hour notice to move, while the remainder of the Battalion was held at four hours notice. Since no measures were allowed to be taken that would give the Egyptians any cause for complaint, it was not possible to send troops into town, as a precautionary measure, to be immediately available in case of trouble. The Battalion was therefore held in readiness in its barracks at Moascar, some two miles from the British residential area of Ismailia.

At about 8.15 am on the 16th October, a party of Egyptians arrived from Cairo and started anti-British demonstrations in the square outside the railway station. A large crowd soon collected and was whipped up into an excited frenzy. The mob started by overturning British cars and trucks, looting their contents and setting them on fire. The civil police made a few half-hearted attempts to disperse them and there was a comparative lull at about 8.45 a.m. British service families, who were in the town in the normal way, took the opportunity to return to their homes but some thirty women and children took refuge in the N.A.A.F.I grocery store in Station Square.

At about 9.15 am the ringleaders led a large crowd to the N.A.A.F.I, set fire to the fence, forced an entry and started looting. The N.A.A.F.I staff and service families were driven into the back premises. At the same time, large crowds were wandering about and shouting in different parts of the town. The situation was completely out of control, the police making little effort to restore order. The Commander 3rd Infantry Brigade, therefore ordered "A" Company of The Lancashire Fusiliers into the town. The Commanding Officer(Lt Col Bamford-Joe) issued instructions for "A" Company to establish itself in French Square and to rescue the British people cut off in the N.A.A.F.I.

"A" Company(OC was Major T.P.Shaw-Joe) immediately proceeded to French Square in three-ton lorries. The square was full of rioters, who were crowding around buses, army vehicles and private cars, which they had set on fire. There were a number of Egyptian police in the square but they were not taking any effective action to disperse the rioters. As soon as the crowd saw the troops arrive they dispersed rapidly in the direction of the station and without any further action being taken the square was cleared. Major T.P. Shaw debussed his company, less one platoon, and put them on the ground in French Square with a Bren gun covering all roads leading into it. At the same time he ordered 2 Platoon to proceed without delay to the N.A.A.F.I with the two empty three-ton lorries in order to rescue the trapped families and bring them back to safety, and on completion of this task to rejoin the company.

There was a large mob in the square outside the N.A.A.F.I, who were by this time completely out of control. They were looting, overturning and firing vehicles, and throwing stones and bottles at any Europeans who showed themselves. The crowd outside the N.A.A.F.I scattered as the vehicles drove up and they pelted them with stones and bottles. 2nd Lt Inchbald debussed his platoon a few hundred yards from the N.A.A.F.I, left an escort of about five men with the vehicles, and proceeded with the rest of his platoon to the N.A.A.F.I on foot.

Four armed Military Police were in the N.A.A.F.I building protecting the families, but they were hemmed in by the crowds. The N.A.A.F.I grocery store by this time was swarming with looters and the building was on fire. 2nd Lt Inchbald drove the crowd back from the immediate vicinity of the N.A.A.F.I, and disposed his sections around it.
He then proceeded to escort the families from the buildings to the waiting vehicles. The crowd closed in again by this time. Many of them were drunk from the whiskey they had looted from the grocery store and the vehicles were again pelted with stones and bottles. 2nd Lt Inchbald then ordered Cpl. Kennedy and the Platoon Sgt. to fire two rounds at the rioters and this drove them back to a safe distance. The women and children were then put in the vehicles and covered up with tarps and camouflage nets to protect them from flying stones and bottles. Most of the families were put on the centre vehicle with the two halves of the platoon in the rear and leading vehicles. 2nd Lt Inchbald drove the families and the N.A.A.F.I staff to the Blue Kettle Restaurant where there was a Military Police Post and then rejoined the Company in French Square'

"Army Mansions" : One of the Ismailia
blocks of flats in which Moascar
families were installed

In the meantime Lt. Col. Bamford arrived in French Square shortly after the Company. He immediately took Major Shaw and a small escort to the N.A.A.F.I to reconnoitre the area. 2 Platoon, with the families, were leaving the N.A.A.F.I just when this party arrived. There was still a very hostile crowd in the square that seemed to be increasing in numbers. Lt. Col. Bamford ordered the party to fire several shots into the N.A.A.F.I to clear it temporarily of looters and also at the crowd, which at this time were closing in and pelting the party with stones. As a result of this recce the Commanding Officer ordered Major Shaw to clear the area of the N.A.A.F.I, of the rioters and drive them back along the parallel roads leading into Arab Town. He also ordered "C" Company to proceed to French Square as quickly as possible from barracks.

As soon as "C" Company arrived in French Square, "A" Company moved out to disperse the rioters from the square in front of the station. The Company moved in column of platoons with a party of Sten gunners, together with the platoon commander in front of each platoon. After a few shots had been fired, the crowd rapidly withdrew from the square and crowded into the streets leading into Arab Town. On the approach of the leading troops, most of the looters in the N.A.A.F.I fled in panic. It was noticeable that amongst them were one or two Egyptian policemen.(Nothing much changed there then,we are still seeing it in Iraq -Joe)After the N.A.A.F.I and the square had been cleared the Company paused to reorganize before clearing the streets leading into Arab Town. At this time a large number of police reinforcements under the command of their own officers arrived in the square but it was evident that they were in sympathy with the rioters and very little could be expected of them. Their own officers, at this stage, were mainly concerned with trying to persuade the various commanders of troops on the spot to exercise the greatest moderation in dealing with the rioters. They seemed oblivious to the fact that the N.A.A.F.I close to them was looted and burnt, that the square was full of vehicles overturned and gutted by fire, and that a large mob was trying to break into the cellars of Army Mansions, a large block of married quarters near by.

On the arrival of one of "C" Company's platoons at the N.A.A.F.I, "A" Company proceeded to drive the mob down the parallel streets leading from the station square and at right angles to the Rue Telatine, which was the physical boundary of Arab Town. At this time, the crowds who had been driven from the square were bunched together in large numbers along the streets and were still very hostile. Anti British slogans of the vilest nature were being shouted and stones and bottles were being thrown. The Company was now split up into columns, each column being in position at the entrance to each particular street. It was hoped that the threat of troops advancing towards the crowd with bayonets fixed would suffice to get them moving back in different directions but this was not so. Although the crowd at the head of each street started to move back, those behind them who could not see what was happening in front, held their ground. After one or two unsuccessful attempts to move the crowd back in this way, the centre column fired two or three bursts of Sten on the ground at a safe distance from the crowd. This was immediately taken up by all the columns on the left and right who did likewise. The noise of these bursts, which opened up almost simultaneously and was accentuated by the echo from the numerous buildings, sounded most effective and the crowd began to move back in haste. After advancing another two hundred yards or so, the columns opened up again and panic set in amongst the rioters as they ran in confusion back across the Rue Telatine into Arab Town. During this advance communication was temporarily lost between the columns, but the rate of advance was approximately the same and each column knew that Company headquarters was moving at the head of the centre one. On arrival at the Rue Telatine, contact was re-established throughout the Company.

Major Shaw put small parties of men, about half sections, on the ground to cover each of the numerous streets leading off the Rue Telatine. The latter was bounded on one side by the Rue Mohd Ali and the Sweet Water Canal and on the other side by the railway line. There were a great many of these streets, and as a result so long was the company perimeter that they were of necessity rather thin on the ground and the whole company was committed without the Company Commander being able to keep a reserve on hand to move to any threatened point. No. 31 set communication with Battalion HQ, which by this time was established, in French square, and each platoon had a No. 88 set. On account of the numerous buildings that separated platoon HQ from each other. No. 88 set communication was not satisfactory.

During the clearing of the square and subsequent advance into Arab Town, several casualties had to be inflicted on the more extreme of the rioters. This had a great effect on the remainder, who for the rest of the day showed a healthy respect for the troops. The troops themselves, many of them young soldiers who had just recently completed their preliminary training and only recently arrived from the United Kingdom, remained very calm in the face of extreme provocation from the crowd who were in a very ugly mood. There was no indiscriminate firing and when fire was opened it was controlled and the minimum of force was used.

The perimeter along the Rue Telatine was established by 1300 hrs, and the situation seemed to be completely restored. The large crowds had vanished amongst the many streets and garrets of Arab Town. Tea and a very welcome hot meal were sent up at this time and the C.Q.M.S distributed the food by doing a "milk round" to each street in turn.

In the afternoon crowds began to concentrate along the Rue Telatine at various points. The main concentration was on the extreme right in front of 2 Platoon's area near the railway line. They were crowding in along the perimeter and gradually increasing in numbers they seemed to be regaining their confidence. These crowds were difficult to deal with. They were not a vast mob out of control under the influence of mob hysteria as the morning rioters had been. They contained an equal number of extremists and talkative individuals who were urging moderation to the former and curious onlookers.

The extremists were attempting to force their way through the cordon and engage individual sentries in arguments. The more moderate individuals were arguing with the extremists and trying to engage the troops in reasonable discussion, while behind there was a rapidly increasing number of curious onlookers who might be persuaded either way and who were gradually pushing those in front closer into the perimeter. Major Shaw visited 2 Platoon area and decided to reinforce this area with troops from quieter parts of the perimeter. 2nd Lt Inchbald made several attempts to drive the crowd away by the threat of troops moving forward with fixed bayonets. He then ordered a few shots to be fired at the crowd and the latter dispersed rapidly. A similar crowd had concentrated close to 1 Platoon perimeter and Sgt. Wall was compelled to open fire, after which the crowd dispersed rapidly.

While the crowds were forming, the Egyptian police, moving from east to west along the Rue Telatine in trucks, attempted to disperse the crowds. On two occasions the method used was to drive rapidly up the Rue Telatine and to fire over the heads of the crowd from moving vehicles. These methods were quite ineffective and on two occasions completely innocent individuals, sitting by the road at street cafes, were hit and wounded.

click on photo to enlarge

At approximately 1600 hrs, Lt. Colonel Bamford sent up supplies of concertina wire and tar barrels filled with stones to form some sort of physical barrier for the cordon. C.S.M. Smith quickly dumped these stores at the end of each street and organized their erection and within an hour each street was blocked with two strands of concertina wire with two or three tar barrels behind them... The half sections protecting each street took up positions behind these obstacles and the Bren gun was put into position at the end of each of the larger streets. Although these wire barriers were not in themselves very formidable obstacles, their psychological value was beyond measure and it became obvious to all the population of Arab Town that any attempt to force these barriers would result in fire being opened from behind the wire. On the extreme left of the perimeter a roadblock was established on the Rue Mohd Ali. This was part of the main road to Port Said and was very crowded with traffic. Captain Porter, second in command of the company, was in charge of this sector. All vehicles moving up the road were stopped and the occupants inspected.

At 1600 Hrs Lt. Colonel Bamford visited Major Shaw and inspected the perimeter in detail. He considered that the company was too thin on the ground for their night dispositions and decided to reinforce the area with "D" Company, who arrived at the Rue Telatine at approximately 1730 hrs. The perimeter was accordingly strengthened. By this time several Egyptian police officers and NCOs had arrived at the perimeter and rendered valuable assistance at the barriers.

The night passed quietly and soon the company settled down to a normal routine. A curfew was imposed on the whole of Arab Town each night after 1900 hrs.

The company "stood to" each morning and evening and were inspected by Major Shaw or Lt. Colonel Bamford. Sentry rosters were made out for the day and double sentries were on duty for two hours at a time by day and night at the barriers. In each platoon area either the platoon Commander or platoon Sgt. was standing by. C.S.M. Smith organized the distribution of food, stores and ammunition. The platoon commander and platoon Sgt. relieved each other for varying periods by day and night. The troops, in their usual adaptable manner, made themselves comfortable in the narrow and dirty streets behind the barriers and were cheerful throughout. Several isolated officers and other ranks families living close to the perimeter did everything in their power to add to the troops comfort. Relays of tea and sandwiches were sent by them to the barriers, newspapers and magazines of every sort were distributed amongst the troops, and several of them allowed the officers and sergeants to take very welcome hot baths in their houses.

Except for one small demonstration on the 17th October, no further incidents took place in the town while the Battalion remained in control. On Thursday 18th October, the GOC agreed to allow the Egyptian police to resume control, although two companies were to be held in the town in immediate readiness in the event of the police losing control. The Battalion therefore handed over the cordon to the Egyptian Police at 1600 Hours. "A" Company returned to Moascar, while "C" and "D" Companies went into billets in the town.

AN ANTI-TERRORIST PATROL

During the month of December there had been considerable sniping at vehicles using the road that passes via Abu Sueir from Moascar to Tel El Kebir (TEK). This road is one that was peculiarly suited to the terrorists' practice of lying up for a vehicle, firing a few bursts of automatic fire at it and then hastily disappearing to avoid reprisals. The road was, until recently, the only one between Moascar and TEK and was therefore much used by military traffic. Added to this was the fact that along its entire length on one side it was bordered by the Sweet-Water Canal, where high banks gave excellent cover for snipers, who could easily retreat into the villages and hamlets that lay in the cultivated land beyond. It was from behind this cover, in fact, that all the sniping had come. Up to the beginning of January the only counter-measures that had been taken were motor patrols along the road but these had proved unsuccessful as the high banks of the canal prevented aimed fire from being directed at the snipers. On 4th January, however, it was decided this nuisance had continued long enough and that the battle would be carried into enemy territory and foot patrols sent across the Sweet Water Canal.

Three platoon commanders Lt.'s Taylor, Inchbald and 2nd Lt. Davis,(Later Major John Davis OC D Coy Weeton-Joe) were therefore called by Major Agar to be briefed on the tasks of their patrols. Lt. Taylor was to command the road patrol which, in conjunction with a troop of the 4th/7th Dragoons, was to cover the crossing of the Sweet Water Canal by the two other patrols commanded by Lt. Inchbald and 2Lt. Davis.

Due to the very heavy guard commitments it was decided that the patrols should consist of entirely volunteers; these were very quickly forthcoming and two patrols of two non-commissioned officers and eight men were formed. Their task was to cross the canal and patrol areas about two miles apart, from which sniping had recently taken place and to intercept thugs going to and returning from the canal bank. The G.O.C. himself had taken an interest in the patrols and expressed confidence in a "bag". It was rumoured that Lt. Taylor wanted to use his Vickers machine gun as indirect fire support but the other two patrol commanders quickly squashed his suggestion.

Once assembled, the orders for dress and administration were soon given to the patrols. They were to leave barracks at 1715 hrs, so an early meal was ordered for 1630 hrs. Dress was to be warm but to give complete freedom of movement. Cap comforters were decided on as being the best form of headgear, sweaters and battle-dress trousers for warmth, with denim slacks to keep off the mud. Gym shoes were worn for quiet movement and speed if necessary. Their armament catered for any eventuality. They took with them two Bren guns, a 2-inch mortar with both illuminating and H.E. bombs, five Sten guns and three rifles. In addition each man carried two Mills grenades. During the afternoon a rehearsal of the patrol formations and signals was held and all the automatic weapons and magazines were tested. As well as the offensive weapons taken, two Very pistols for communication between the patrols were included. The signals were simple. One red light to show position, and request assistance, and one green for cease-fire.

The final preparation was completed with a coating of wet sticky cocoa powder plastered over face neck and hands until the patrol was almost taken for its opponents.

The patrols left barracks at 1715 hrs and moved down to the road junction where they were to rendezvous with the armoured cars of the 4th/7th Dragoons. They had not arrived when the patrols got there but a great deal of shooting could be heard going on up the road and tracer was being fired across the Sweet Water Canal. 2nd Lt. Davis decided not to wait for the Dragoons but to push across the Canal and attempt to join the battle with the terrorists. The assault boat was hastily unloaded, assembled and sent on its way across the canal. As it reached the other bank the armoured cars could be heard approaching and Lt. Taylor decided to wait for their arrival before moving off. When the cars were about 300 yards away, rifle fire was opened on them from across the Sweet Water Canal; they immediately stopped and fired back. 2nd Lt. Davis's patrol was then moving in this area and only by promptly putting up a green very light was disaster averted. 2nd Lt. Davis immediately went in search of the thugs but was unsuccessful. The two other patrols went on in company with the Dragoons, who said they had been involved in an incident in which the Egyptians had shot up two RAF vehicles, killed one NCO, and wounded another and one officer. They hastened up the road towards this place, where it was decided that Lt. Inchbald should take his patrol across. After going about a mile they were fired on from an area by an orchard and Lt. Taylor stopped and returned fire with a light machine gun and 2 inch mortar while Lt. Inchbald and the armoured cars pressed on up the road. A good crossing place was reached close to the scene of the accident and the assault boat launched. The crossing went without incident and the armoured cars joined with Lt. Taylor and continued with their patrol.

On reaching the other bank, Lt. Inchbald left Cpl. Hardy and two Fusiliers with a light machine gun to guard the boat and taking the rest of his patrol, moved quickly along under cover of the Canal bank. After going for some 200 yards they struck inland to the cover of a line of palm trees. There was no sound of enemy activity now and the patrol therefore laid up in ambush on one of the main paths leading to the Canal in the hope of waylaying some of the culprits returning to the villages.

After lying up for about twenty minutes on the cold wet ground, the patrol was becoming a little restless when three shots rang out from the canal bank. Instantly the whole patrol was alert. After a few minutes Cpl. Wilson(was this the Tug Wilson later to be CSM of SP Coy in HK?-Joe) suddenly saw three natives hurrying down the path towards them. The patrol was tense, waiting for the absolute recognition of the natives. They came towards the waiting patrol one man lagging about ten yards behind the other two. When they were about forty yards away it could be clearly seen that they were carrying weapons of some kind and at the patrol commanders order, fire was opened. All three natives dropped in their tracks, the first two killed outright. The third one however, was not hit and fired back at the patrol. He then disappeared, presumably along one of the irrigation ditches, and a search failed to find any trace of him. The first two were found to be armed with Sten guns that had obviously been fired that evening, and several magazines of ammunition. These were taken and the bodies left on the track where they would be found next morning.

The patrol continued on its way until it came to the village from which a great deal of the firing had come earlier in the night. This had been heavily strafed by the armoured cars, and there was no sign of life whatsoever. One of the native palm-thatched huts was still burning, and nearby was a dead donkey lying grotesquely on its back. They cautiously entered the village and slowly and silently moved through, seeing and hearing nothing until suddenly rounding the corner of a house a big dog leapt snarling and whining from almost under their feet. Startled Fusilier Walters, who was carrying a mortar, jumped back and crashed into the rifle of the man behind him and fell to the ground, fortunately unhurt. The incident caused considerable mirth when we were safely back in barracks but at the time no one found it at all amusing, least of all Fusilier Walters.

It was now time for the patrol to withdraw and this they did, keeping to the cover of the embankment and watching for any signs of cable-cutters on the line of the road, nothing however was seen and they arrived back at the boat. After about ten minutes the road patrol arrived and a red Very light was put up signalling them to stop. The boat was loaded into the truck and the combined patrols moved on to pick up 2nd Lt. Davis. The road patrol had itself been engaged in an action near Moascar and had set fire to a hut from which the firing had come. 2nd Lt. Davis was waiting when the patrols arrived and reported nothing seen, save for one old man on a donkey, who cheerily wished them "saida". So all three patrols returned to barracks, a successful mission accomplished.

On the Newspaper cutting below
1.Lancashire Fusiliers at the Naafi in Ismailia to rescue army wifes shopping after terrorist set it on fire.
2. Egyptian policeman that had joined in the looting at the Naafi.
All cars belonging to servicemen where overturned and set on fire that day

§ The Secretary of State for War (Mr. Antony Head)
Yes, Sir, I am arranging for a detailed account of the incidents in Ismailia on 25th January to be published today in the OFFICIAL REPORT.

§ Following is the statement:

§ General.

§ On 16th October, 1951, the Egyptian police failed to control the riots which broke out in Ismailia and British troops had to restore order. After this 600 auxiliary police arrived from Cairo.

§ Egyptian terrorists had been and continued attacking our troops and convoys while the Egyptian police looked on. In some cases the auxiliary police, alongside the terrorists, attacked our troops. On 17th, 18th and 19th November, 1951, the auxiliary police fired on our patrols in Ismailia. After this General Erskine arranged for the regular and auxiliary Egyptian police to remain in their barracks while our families evacuated the town. After this both regular and auxiliary police in Ismailia were replaced by fresh companies from Cairo.

§ The normal rôle in Egypt of auxiliary police is to provide a reserve for riot duty armed with staves. Those sent to the Canal Zone on both occasions were armed with rifles.

363
§ After the change over had taken place evidence increased that the new auxiliary police were taking part in attacks on our troops and installations. On 3rd and 4th December, 1951, auxiliary police opened fire on our troops near the water filtration plant outside Suez and killed 11. On 18th December, 1951, fire from the police station in Ismailia killed a British officer passing in a jeep.

§ Twenty auxiliary police and four terrorists in a lorry attacked a road block near Tel-El-Kebir. As a result of this and other attacks in the neighbourhood our troops cleared the area, finding, in the police station compound of El Hammada (a small village), a senior police major-general and 116 armed police, as well as quantities of ammunition and other arms.

§ The steadily mounting casualties amongst our troops and the attacks upon them caused the Commander-in-Chief, at the end of November, 1951, to recommend the disarming of the auxiliary police. On 7th December, 1951, His Majesty's Government authorised the Commander-in-Chief to take this step if the situation demanded it.

§ On 23rd January, 1952, when our casualties had reached 33 killed and 69 wounded, the Commander-in-Chief told the Chiefs of Staff that, in view of the repeated evidence of attack by the auxiliary police, he considered that he must disarm those in Ismailia, and that he had ordered General Erskine to do so. His Majesty's Government approved this decision.

§ Narrative of Events

§ Location of Egyptian Police on morning of 25th January.

§ The position in Ismailia on the morning of 25th January was:—

(a) About 400 Egyptian police, of whom about 60 were regulars, were in the Caracol, the normal regular Police Station and the Governor's Office.
(b) Some 600 Egyptian police, almost all auxiliaries, were in the Bureau Sanitaire located about 400 yards distant from the Caracol. The Bureau Sanitaire is normally the health office but was taken over as temporary barracks for the additional auxiliary police.

§ Message to the Sub-Governor of Ismailia

§ The operation started with a message to the Sub-Governor of Ismailia to the effect that, since the auxiliary police had been firing on our troops as well as helping the terrorists, it was necessary to disarm them. He was therefore requested to order them to come out of their barracks without arms, and told that arms would be restored to the regular police who would then be allowed to continue their duties.

§ Message to the Major-General Commanding the Police

§ A similar message was sent to the major-general commanding the police who was at his residence. He replied that both the regular and auxiliary police would resist in accordance with their orders from the Egyptian Government. In view of this statement the operations against the Caracol and the Bureau Sanitaire were put in train.

364
§ The Caracol

§ In operations against the Caracol Egyptian casualties did not exceed single figures and ours were none. The Egyptian police opened fire first and subsequently fired repeatedly. The buildings were not damaged.

§ The Bureau Sanitaire

§ The major operations took place against the Bureau Sanitaire of which the occupants were almost all auxiliary police. This building had been substantially fortified since its occupation by the auxiliary police.

§ At 0614 hours and continuing until 0640 hours broadcasts were made from loudspeaker vans calling upon the police to surrender. At 0656 hours firing by the police started from the Bureau Sanitaire and continued with increasing intensity until 0710 hours. We then retaliated by firing one round of blank from a 20-pounder tank gun as a warning. The police continued to fire.

§ At 0715 hours we returned the fire for the first time, six rounds of 20-pounder tank gun and a few rounds of two-pounder being fired as well as small arms. This produced a very heavy fusillade from the police.

§ A fresh broadcast was then made, followed by a pause to give them time to surrender. At 0815 hours fire was again opened by us on the same scale, followed by a broadcast with another pause for surrender. All this had no effect on the police and they continued to fire.

§ At 0900 hours two platoons of our infantry, supported by tanks, forced their way inside the walled compound of the Bureau Sanitaire which was used as barracks by the auxiliary police. Our infantry quickly suffered fourteen casualties and were withdrawn.

§ Final Surrender

§ At 1000 hours fire was opened again and at 1037 hours surrender started. We suffered three killed and 13 wounded. The Egyptian police casualties were 41 killed, 73 wounded, and 886 surrendered.

§ Weapons used by British Troops

§ The weapons used by our troops consisted of small arms, tanks from which 23 rounds of 20-pounder were fired, armoured cars which used a few rounds of two-pounder ammunition. No artillery, aircraft or mortars were used except for one round of 2 in. smoke.

§ Comments

§ The operation was planned with the object of avoiding bloodshed. The buildings were surrounded at dawn and every possible effort was then made to persuade the police to surrender, but the responsible officials refused to take any action and the police general in Ismailia steadfastly remained in his quarters throughout the whole proceedings.

§ The police in the Bureau Sanitaire were first called upon to surrender at 0614 hours, but it was not until 0715 hours that British troops opened fire in spite of the fact that they themselves had been under fire from the Egyptians since 0656 hours—nearly 20 minutes earlier.

365
§ The first serious attempt to enter the building was made by our infantry nearly two hours later after a series of broadcasts, and this attempt immediately resulted in fourteen casualties to our troops. In order to avoid much greater casualties on both sides it was essential to complete the operation as soon as possible and in any case in daylight.

§ There were no casualties to civilians. Transport was produced quickly after the surrender and prisoners were taken away for a meal, whilst our doctors gave immediate medical attention to the wounded, some of whom were taken to our hospital and the remainder to the Egyptian hospital.

§ If the Egyptian Government had maintained proper control over their police forces and, in particular, their auxiliaries, it would never have been necessary to carry out the operation at all.

These Photos have been locked away in a camera for 40 years what gems they.
Kitner and Jack Nash to name but a few
They have been sent in by

ALAN WHITTALL

	A	B	C	D
1.
2.

ALAN WHITTALL "was a signaller with Major Chance on the day of the attack and spent the whole day in the lead Jeep at the Gate of the Bureau Sanitaire,he has sent in a radio log of the events from the 1st East Lancs who were manning the outer cordon Wireless log of morning of Friday, 25th January 1952; the wireless set was on the grass running down to the Sweetwater Canal, at the bridge outside Bn HQ 1st East Lancashire Regt. Lt-Col Jones ordered the log so that he could know what was going on. He was watching the Caracol. See aerial photo of Ismailia the times are nearly all approximate as I had no watch, Notes: Air OP - a spotter plane overhead, a Westland Lysander, I..think Bureau Sanitaire - the secondary police station LF - the lst Lancashire Fusiliers Acorn - signal code for intelligence officer Caracol - the main police station Seagull - signal code for second in command Royals - the Royal Dragoons Auxiliaries - auxiliary Egyptian police, mostly without uniforms and not disciplined. 3 Para - the 3rd Parachute Regiment Arashiya - an Arab quarter of Ismailia Sunray - signal code for commander FS - Field Security 41 Fd Rgt - 41 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery Colonel Malik - the Egyptian Army liaison officer with the British Page 1 0637 6 police on firing position on roof (Air OP) 0640 Commander reports owing to lack of officers in Caracol he will probably have to use force (Comdr Rover) 0645 No one on roof. Police skulking under trees in rear (Air OP) 0649 Lot (8) of police on Bureau Sanitaire armed with rifles (Air OP) 0655 LFs received above message (verified receipt)(1LF) 0658 (20) police on North building of Bureau Sanitaire except for 1 on South building (Air OP) 0700 SW corner of North building of BS defended position of oil drums with 10 police on ground (Air OP) 0705 Police on roof of bureau Sanitaire appear to be drawing ammunition 0707 3 riflemen on South end of bureau Sanitaire (Air OP) 0709 Police taking up positions around Bureau Sanitaire on ground (Control to lLF and CMDR ROVER) 0715 Inform Acorn very fat officer wearing Khaki SD on roof of Bureau Sanitaire (Air OP) Approx times Page 2 0713 Vehicle fired on from roof of BS (?) 0715 (Exact time) Battle going on in bureau Sanitaire (control to 1LF') 0718 NW side of BS. Police collected. Only 10 on East side (Air OP) 0723 Battle still in progress (control to 1LF) 0726 Malik with Egyptian general. Egyptian general refuses to leave house until firing ceases. Caracol ordered to cease firing and to hang out white flag. Egyptian general will then go down to caracol (1LF) 0727 caracol surrounded. Officers keep arriving. ordered to get wogs out. No success. Comdr not anxious to open fire. Hopes wogs see sense, BS certain firing. Round of blank fired. All fired back. general shooting. wants to have 0726 message verified. Verified by seagull. Sounds promising. Remaining outside caracol. (From commdr) 0747 Almost all police have left roof of BS . Only 5 or 6 and 1 or 2 bodies on roof now (Air OP) Page 3 0748 Situation status quo. Not anxious to blow place down, awaiting major-general. Then if fire from BS will try to get maj-general to BS (Commdr 0749 Eg general does not intend to get police out (seagull) 0750 Arms and thugs hidden in Stelio's Gardens in rear of cordon. Rue Abbas Makim (1 E Lan R) Page 4 0753 (Exact Am of opinion must blow place down. Can I wait for few hours to get sense out of general (Comdr) 0754 ----i. Tell police they have acted honourably and come out. ----------ii. Use fire engine hoses. (Seagull to Bde Comdr) 0755 Follow up first suggestion in Bureau Sanitaire. (Comdr) and Caracol. (Comdr to Seagull) 0800 Our people have stopped firing at Sanitaire Bureau (B Sqdn Royals) Page 4 continued 0813 Malik says he has reached complete impasse. In that case tell General his Caracol will be severely damaged. Lives on his head, (Seagull to Comdr) Big Sunray says good thing if regular police could come out with arms. NOT auxiliaries. Pass to Malik. (Bde Comdr to Seagull) 0824 Malik told general. General will concert officers in Caracol to see if accept these terms. Is doubtful if they wall. (Seagull to comdr) Page 5 0835 Armed wogs running west to East in Arab Town outside cordon area of 1 E Lan R. 1 E Lan R is engaging them. only few of them. That is the sniping you can hear. (Control to Comdr) 0845 Sitrep from 3 Para 1 No of pers in cage A Army Lg 4 B 1 officer 36 OR railway police C 26 OH army police (other? police) 2 Police cas 1OR shot dead. N side of railway. 3 Own cas 1 OR wounded 4 Arms and ammo impounded. 60 assorted rifles 1.38 revolver small amount of var ammo. Law and order maintained in Arashiya. (3 Para to Seagull) 0851 Still parleying with Caracol. Think things look like Happening. (Comdr to Seagull) Page 6 0935 Seagull to set. Sunray what is position about army (Egyptian) Seagull 1 shot fired from Egyptian camp killed 1 LF, Camp covered. Normal activity among Egyptians. Comd Make point clear to Big Sunray, Warn Douglas to be prepared. Have no success at Caracol. Am opening with 2 pounders. Tanks will return fire with Beca. (From Comdr to Seagull) Seagull 2 dead 3 wounded our casualties. 0940 Don't endanger lives unnecessarily. (Seagull to 1LF) Page 6 continued 0945 Seagull to Sunray Ask Sunray to call me. 0955 3 ORs killed 5 wounded - 4ORs., 1 officer (From 1 LF) 0957 2 police officers brought in by sub units. Found hiding in cupboard in Hotel Ismailia. 1 officer believed holding rank of colonel. (From 3 Para) Page 7 1000 hrs Seagull on set Called to ask whether Caracol is to go in. Comdr Caracol has gone in. Seagull, Pause after softeningup. Another broadcast now to Police. (Seagull to Bde Comdr) 1001 Ambulance to French Square. (1LF) 1007 Further ambulance sent to French Square (to 1LF) 1009 Confirm report that bureau S. has surrendered (To 1 LF) we confirm that (1 LF) 1010 Do you require FS team now? (To 1LF) (1012 Se Liaison officer to set (D15) Cancelled. CROSSED OUT IN ORIGINAL 1014 (I,0, on set) Seagull will you confirm that Caracol has surrendered. Do you want FS? Sunray No. Caracol has shown no sign of surrendering. Unconfirmed reports that BS has surrendered. Report about Caracol is quite incorrect. Page 8 1014 Sunray what is true posn at bureau sanitaire? (To Seagull) 1015 1 LF' Sunray to set`, ( on other net) 1022 Seagull to set. Sunray Rumour of surrender in BS is incorrect. Ascertain number are now coming out hands up (acc to armd car cmdr) Tonight 1 want to relieve LFs. If possible I would like another unit to take over. Seagull Cas to LF 7 wounded, 3 killed. 1030 IO to set,. Seagull, Tell sunray or IO to call me, 1032 Seagull Agreed that our 2nd bn be made available this evening. Had report from Caracol that police want ambulance for wounded, unwilling to surrender. Seagull Ambulance not to be sent until surrender, Page 9 1046 Small parties coming out of BS (From 1LF) FS to be sent 1047 1 or 2 police on top of BS (Air OP) 1050 Seagull All police will now be considered POW None to be evacuated Sunray Heard rumours that 200 people surrendered in BS Seagull Small parties coming out now. 1050 Party of police being marched towards French Square (Air OP) 1055 We are now in French Square ( Comdr) 1056 At Caracol by green bus is deep pit which contains 6 police. Pit leads to door underground (Air OP) 1057 FS men have been sent (To 1LF) Page 10 1103 I think BS is finished. Large crowds have surrendered (200 or 300 and more coming in) Get transport to move them. Seagull 41 Fd Rt are providing transport (Sunray to Seagull) 1106 Will you arrange for transport to move prisoners now. Arrange through gunner rep. (Control to 1LF) 1115 We have 2 Egyptian Red X officials who want to pass cordon. Can they pass (3 Para) 1120 Who are these officials? If doctors, yes. if not lot me know who they are. (Control to 3 Para) 1122 Still one or two people being winkled out of BS (Air OP) 1125 Are these officials doctors? (Control) ..........No they are not doctors. They call themselves Red X officials (3 Para) 1127 Use initiative. If part of ambulance let them through. (Control to 3 Para) Search them. Page 11 1130 Egyptian POW being taken away. App. no. 400 (1LF to Control) page 11 continued 1134 Sunray Is malik with you? ..........Seagull No. Not for 3 hrs. probably on bridge. ..........Sunray Want him urgently. (Sunray to Seagull) 1137 Please confirm whether Egyptian ambulances can collect wounded from BS (Control to 1LF) 1141 Egypt. Ambulance will be let through if OK with Sunray (1LF to Control) 1143 Egypt. Ambulances will come through your cordons after searching. When return, check wounded number (To 1LF and 1 E Lan R) 1145 Malik is not on bridge. May be in HQ in Moascar. Phone him (Seagull to Control) 1146 Have you received supplies of Tear gas? (Control to 1LF) Page 12 1155 Malik, Egyptian Army off. Also member of Egyptian Red Crescent, have gone through barrier into Ismailia looking for ambulances (1 E Lan R to Control) 1200 Everyone to look for Colonel Malik. He is to be told to report to Sunray, Urgent, 1215 Coming out of Caracol surrendering now ( B Sqd Royals to Control) 1217 21 elderly people come out so far, Elderly sergeant type. (B Sqd Royals) 1220 Ask your Sunray to report this location straight away (Control to 3 Para) 1223 Police officer just come out of Caracol to see Brigadier. Being sent in jeep. 1225 Sunray has left location. 1225 Contacted Colonel Mallett (B.M.Rover) ( should be Malik?) Page 13 1230 Have you sent police captain down to this location as well an Colonel Mallett (Control to BM) (should be Malik?) No (BM) He is still outside Caracol (BM) He is being sent dawn. 1231 Confirm whether 400 Egyptian police have been removed? (Control to 1LF) All except about 80 men (1LF) 1237 33 thugs and 1 women surrendered at back of Caracol now (b Sqdn Royals) 100 prisoners including police, 1239 what percentage are thugs and what % police? (Control to B Sqdn Royals) 1234 3 ORs killed.1 off. Wounded.11 OR wounded (1LF to Control) 1245 Total figure is 300 now. Taking some sorting out. Percentage follows. All from Caracol. (B Sqdn Royals ) 1246 Sunray at (aracoL Page 14 ----Bill's writing 1251 19b Check 40 police killed. 3 to 4 hundred rifles SMLE. 1000s rds .300. No. of carbines (believed Italian) (B Sqdn Royals) 1254 19B 400 From Caracol- Gellabiahs, greatcoats, uniforms. Impossible to say which are police. (B Sqdn Royals) 1300 Netting call. 1315 Proceed to Ferry Pt, and check report that there are 6 Egyptian tanks on other side. (To Air OP) 1320 NO tanks, but there are 6 armoured cars, directly opposite Ferry Pt. (From Air OP) 1323 Sunray. Like to confirm that LFs reserve coy are going through lsmailia picking up odd policeman. Pass general warning - NO looting. (Sunray to Seagull) Page 14 continued 1324 Reserve coy go through Ismailia mopping up police. No looting. (Seagull to 1LF) Page 15 1325 Send 3 3ton vehicles to collect arms and ammo from Bureau Sanitaire (1LF to Control) 1326 Sunray. Police officers from Caracol are to be sent to Timsah leave camp. See they are secure and well fed. (Sunray to Seagull) (1333) Sunray requires a packet of cigarettes at Caracol, ) Crossed out in original. 1340 5 3tonners will be at BS at 1400hrs. (Control to 1LF) 1345 May this unit stand down? (Sapper to Control) Yes. Except for small recce party. (Control to sapper) 1350 36 dead, 60 wounded,557 rifles captured at Bureau Sanitaire. (B Sqdn Royals to Control.) 1352 fr DI Sweep of this area begins 1415 (1LFs to Control) Bill's writing. Citation of No 14049945 Cpl (acting Sgt) Henry Foster The Lancashire Fusiliers Sgt Foster was platoon sergeant of 8 platoon of C Company on the morning of 25th January 1952. At about 0900 hours his platoon was ordered to enter the courtyard of the Egyptian Police Barracks in the Bureau Sanitaire, Ismalia and to clear the left wing of the building. The Egyptian Police were covering the courtyard with heavy rifle fire, and in the first five minutes of the action Sgt Foster received a bullet wound in his right upper arm. He ignored this and carried on. The platoon was held up about half way across the courtyard and Sgt Foster moved about in the open putting LMG's into fire positions and encouraging his men. About five minutes later he was again hit in the leg but ignored this wound and remained at his post. Under cover of MG fire from the tanks in support the platoon managed to reach the building and gain lodgement. Resistance was strong, and Sgt Foster led a party throwing grenades. Shortly after this, and about half an hour after receiving his first wound, he was again hit by a rifle bullet in the leg this time severely. Although in great pain, he refused assistance - he was only evacuated on the direct order of his platoon commander. Throughout the action Sgt Foster had shown complete disregard for his own safety and his gallantry and good leadership were an example to all ranks of his company.

The next two photos have been sent to us by Malcolm Bingham
This is Colin Bingham who drove the lead vehicle when Major Chance was injured at the Police Barracks Ismailia.
There are 2 questions:-
1.Is that him on the ground by the vehicle wheel (back to camera) on Alan Whittall's pics Photo A1?
2.Does anyone remember him?(It is likely that he came to us from another regiment,see the pic with a different cap badge)

22495341 L/Cpl Colin Bingham

ISMAILIA CASUALTIES
Casualities During Civil Disturbances
on 25th January, 1952.
Killed

Moascar Cemetary

22278484 Fus. Eastham, A.E, "C Coy"

19038787 L/Cpl. Eastham, H. "C Coy"

22208211 L/Cpl. McKenzie,J. "C Coy"

22587881 Fus. Lowe,J. "C Coy"

The Following receivedWounds
Major. N.E.H.Chance, M.C. "C"
3443875 C.S.M. Murphy, B. Support
14049995 Sgt, Foster, H. "C"
22203239 Cpl. Harrison, W. "C"
22404460 Fus. Siddall, A.B. "C"
22587802 Fus. Grimes,W. "C"
22538468 Fus. Nally, T. "C"
22215305 Fus. Allen, A.B. "C"
21127616 Fus. Roberts, J. "C"
22393400 Fus. Fenton, A. "C"
NB. Fus A.B.Allen, later died of his wounds
in the
Military Hospial, Moascar Garrison.

Fus A.B. Allen

Lest We Forget.
Those who were killed were buried with full military honours with drums beating and a firing party, made up of members of "C" Company, was under the command of Sgt. Reid.

Citations Sgt H. Foster & WO2 Taffy Williams
Memtioned in Dispatches.

The" Lads from Lancashire" performed in the best traditions of the British Army, yet recognition was not to be theirs.

Because of Political expedience,this gallant action went almost unnoticed and was played down by the Government.

Within a very short time 1LF were off to Kenya